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Abstract
Emerging technologies such as broadband services and mobile and wireless technologies create not only benefits for
the community but also risks (Choo, Smith, McCusker 78: iii, 2007). The implications of these developments should be
evaluated to make any necessary changes to policing, policy and legislation. This study investigates the risk of
disclosure of confidential information via online public exercise routes. The study identified in particular whether a)
people inadvertently disclose their home address more often indirectly via online sports tracking networks than
directly via other means and whether b) gender and age play a role in this disclosure. In addition, an analysis of the
temporal characteristics of runs was performed to establish the window of opportunity for a home burglary and
whether running is temporally predictable by hour of day or day of week. A total of 513 RunKeeper users were
selected from the Dutch cities of Enschede and Nijmegen. 231 runners (45.03%) were located via RunKeeper and 122
(23.78%) via other Internet (i.e. non-social sports network) sources. It was found that a statistical difference exists
between the indirect and direct disclosure of addresses; more runners disclose their home address via online sports
tracking networks than via other sources. Furthermore, it was found that age played a role in the direct disclosure of
addresses but not in the indirect disclosure. Older users more often disclosed their home address directly than
younger ones. Conversely, gender plays a role in the indirect disclosure but not in the direct disclosure. Men more
often disclosed their home address indirectly than women. Regarding temporal characteristics, it was found that the
window of opportunity for a burglary is approximately 1 hour. Furthermore, the ‘within subject’ analysis suggests that
the starting hour of the run is the most predictable temporal characteristic, followed by the duration of the run and
the day of the week. This research ultimately shows the extent to which the unique combination of spatial and
temporal information available in online sports tracking networks can enable criminals to predict where a potential
target lives and when he or she will be out running.
Keywords: Leisure; Online social sports networks; Situational crime prevention; Spatio-temporal analysis;
Home address location
Background
According to the ‘routine activity approach’ (Cohen and
Felson 1979), three elements must converge in space and
in time for crime to take place: a) a suitable target (per-
son or product), b) a likely offender and c) absence of
a capable guardian. People can facilitate their victimiza-
tion by deliberately, negligently or unconsciously placing
themselves at special risk even when they do not take
an ‘active’ part in the crime (Sparks 1982). Hindelang
et al. (1978)’s ‘lifestyle-exposure theory of personal vic-
timization’ complements the previous views. This theory
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argues that victimization risk is a function of lifestyle,
and in particular, that patterns of leisure expose people
to victimization opportunities. Both the part of the pop-
ulation that reports spending leisure time online and the
total time spent online have been increasing since 2008.
However, the internet is changing leisure patterns since
the total leisure time remains constant (Wallsten 2011).
This study investigates whether the online publishing of
running activities on sports social networks increases run-
ners’ vulnerability to crime in general, and home burglary
in particular.
Protecting personal information is important to pre-
vent victimization. Specific privacy concerns of online
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social networking include inadvertent disclosure of per-
sonal information, damaged reputation due to rumours
and gossip, unwanted contact and harassment or stalking,
surveillance-like structures due to backtracking functions
(i.e. retracing actions), use of personal data by third-
parties, hacking, and identity theft (Boyd and Ellison
2007). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(2014), predators, hackers, business competitors, and for-
eign state personnel troll social networking sites looking
for information or people to target. News items and police
websites often report that on-line sites such as Google
Earth Street View, Facebook and Twitter are being used
by burglars to target homes and businesses (e.g. Douglas
County Sheriff 2013). Several sources have reported that
many convicted burglars think that other burglars use
social networks to identify targets (e.g. Distinctive Doors
2013). Moreover, a survey of 69 former burglars indi-
cated that checking social media status is a favourite
way of identifying target burglary homes (Edith Cowan
University 2011, McMillan 2012). This seems to indicate
that it is no longer the case that burglars are opportunis-
tic and operate only on-the-ground, but that there are
also technologically-savvy ones who operate in a more
premeditative manner. In addition, it indicates that social
media is used for the planning of a wide range of crimes.
Several studies (Ibrahim 2008, Tufekci 2008, Waters and
Ackerman 2011) found that online social network users
constantly balance perceived privacy risks and expected
benefits. The most important benefit of online networks
is probably the social capital resulting from creating and
maintaining interpersonal relationships and friendship
(Ellison et al. 2007). Studies reveal a ‘privacy paradox’
which is the disparity between reported privacy attitudes
and observed privacy behaviours. In a study of online
social network use and privacy, for example, those with
Facebook profiles had greater concerns about strangers
obtaining personal information about them than those
who didn’t have such profiles. However, among those with
profiles, there was no relationship between participants’
privacy concerns and the likelihood of them providing
this information on the website (Stutzman and Kramer-
Duffield 2010).
The research by (Madden and Smith 2010) and
(Kramer-Duffield 2010) reveals four important general
issues regarding personal information found online:
1. While basic contact information continues to top
search lists, demand for social networking profiles and
photos has grown considerably over time.
2. Young adults (i.e. ages 18-29) more often limit the
amount of online information available about them
than older adults.
3. Internet users are now more likely to search for
social networking profiles than they are to search
for information about someone’s professional accom-
plishments or interests.
4. Females are more likely to have a friends-only Face-
book account than males.
With regards to address information, Acquisti and
Gross (2006) indicated that 24% of the Facebook users
disclose their home address. Madden and Smith (2010)
reached a similar conclusion (i.e. personal address dis-
closure of 26%) and also found that 23% of the users
were unaware whether their home address could be found
online. The research by boyd and Hargittai (2010) shows
that people change their privacy settings more often
than before. However, the authors consider that fur-
ther research is needed to establish whether people fully
understand the effect of the privacy setting changes they
chose. These figures highlight that emerging technolo-
gies create not only benefits but also risks (Choo et al.
2007) and in particular, that information and communica-
tion technologies (ICT) lead to new crime opportunities.
The Dutch Police (2012), for example, advises people to
use social networks with caution and warns against shar-
ing holiday information, photos or their current location.
Although it is not wise to disclose personal information
such as home address on the Internet, the figures show
that this is common practice. This research answers the
question of whether people unknowingly disclose address
information indirectly more often using online social
sport networks than directly via other online sources.
The rapid development of mobile applications has
driven smartphone adoption. An example of a new type
of smartphone-based mobile application is online sports
tracking. This type of application is able to record data
about exercises such as lifting counts during body build-
ing or recording the cycling or running speed on a map.
The underlying technology behind the latter example is
called geo-location. Geo-location uses data acquired from
a radio or network connection enabled device to identify
or describe the actual physical location. Despite its many
benefits, geo-location does increase risk (ISACA 2011).
Furthermore, when tracking allows somebody else’s loca-
tion to be traced, it is a sensitive issue from a privacy point
of view (Klerks and Kop 2008). The risk, security, privacy
and ethical concerns of geo-location and tracking aremost
often discussed in the context of enterprises and less often
in the context of leisure. Leisure is important because peo-
ple in many countries nowadays have more time available
for it (Aguiar andHurst 2007, Klerks and Kop 2008, OECD
2009).
Examples of current sport applications include RunK-
eeper, Endemondo, Strava, MapMyFitness, Nike+, Zom-
bies, Run! and SportsTracker. Such applications are largely
used by runners and have created a social network where
people store recorded workouts and share their favourite
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routes with others. This type of software can be download
by anyone and installed on a wide range of computer sys-
tems (e.g. smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops) but the
GPS-enabled smartphone plays a key role since the route
data is typically collected and uploaded onto the internet
by means of this device. The user either creates a new
account or connects using e.g. Facebook login informa-
tion. Invitations for joining one’s network are sent out in a
very similar manner as in Facebook or LinkedIn. This step
is optional because the user can choose not to send invi-
tations, which still gives him access to all the public routes
of other runners. In the particular case of RunKeeper, and
at the time of writing this, it was possible (but not com-
pulsory) to list one’s location (e.g. city, country), the type
of sport activity (e.g. running, swimming, cycling, skiing)
and add a profile picture. The user could specify, based on
the type of person (i.e. everyone, friends or nobody), the
type of data (e.g. activities, activity maps, fitness reports,
background activities, general body measurements) to be
shared. It was also possible to prevent the user profile from
showing up in search results. Another interesting feature
from the security and privacy viewpoints was the option
to connect to other sport or health-related applications.
Sports tracking applications introduce a new type of
problem because the sharing of routes implies the dis-
closure of information about personal routine activities.
The data available enables the identification not only of
the route the runner followed but also of its temporal
characteristics (i.e. when the run took place and its total
duration). Runners are therefore disclosing the temporal
pattern of their sport activities but because most of them
start and stop their run at home, they also unwarily reveal
their home address.
Burglary can result from personal information disclo-
sure. The disclosure of a runner’s home address as well
as the temporal pattern of the sports activity facilitates
crime. The relationship status on a social network such
as Facebook or photos posted on Facebook or RunK-
eeper could be used to assess the likelihood that the per-
son lives alone or accompanied. This is relevant because
burglars prefer to avoid occupied homes (Bennett 1992,
Bennett and Wright 1984, Hakim et al. 2001, Rengert and
Wasilchick 2000, Waller and Okihiro 1978, Winchester
and Jackson 1982) which explains why the most vulner-
able homes are those of single-persons, single-parents,
and younger-occupants (Rengert and Wasilchick 2000,
Winchester and Jackson 1982). Although the duration of
the absence from home strongly predicts burglary risk
(Weisel 2002), many sources indicate that it takes bur-
glars less than 10 minutes to break into a house and
leave with the stolen items (e.g. Cusson 1993, Safewise
2013). In the case of running, the capable guardian is
likely to be away and the suitable target objects are most
likely at home since mobile phones are among the few
items carried during running. Clarke (1999) discussed ‘hot
products’ as items that attract attention and are targeted
by thieves. Offenders focus on relatively few ‘hot prod-
ucts’, such as cars, laptop computers, DVD players, and
mobile phones (Clarke and Eck 2005). The Internet and
social networks in particular, provide a platform for iden-
tifying ‘hot products’. The Dutch Police (2012) states that
80% of burglary is opportunistic (‘thieves have Facebook
too’). For example, posting a photo of one’s new ultrabook
computer and of the sports data via social media canmake
the runner’s house a suitable target. In contrast, posting
a photograph of one’s expensive bicycle and of the sports
data via social media might make the cyclist a suitable
target to be robbed while out cycling. Internet searches
reveal that in some countries it is common for cyclists to
be forced to hand over their bicycles to criminals whilst
out cycling (Miller 2013; Sapa 2013).
In summary, the present paper argues that sensitive
information such as a home address coupled with the
spatio-temporal characteristic of a workout creates (or
increases) opportunity and facilitates several forms of vic-
timization. In addition, on the Internet an offender does
not have to come face-to-face with a potential target,
which might make the act of target victimization easier
(Petee et al. 2010). Online social sport networks provide
relevant information for what in the field of museum theft
is known as ‘silently planned crime’, which is crime that
despite having low probability, can be prepared over a long
period of time and which, at least in its planning phase,
entails low detection risk. Erez (1980) argues, for example,
that what may appear to be a spur of the moment crime
could have been in the mind of the offender all along.
Figure 1 shows the steps involved to identify the home of
a runner based on online social sport network data. Only
one step involves an ‘on the ground’ activity.
To the best of our knowledge, no research has been
conducted about the potential of sports tracking apps as
crime facilitators. However, there are two relevant gen-
eral studies involving geo-location-enabled mobile appli-
cations. Dillon-Scott (2011) concluded that the majority
of respondents are concerned about sharing their location
without consent (84%), having their personal information
or identity stolen and suffering loss of privacy (83%). Simi-
larly, GSMA (2013) found that 92% of respondents in their
survey want to be asked for their permission before shar-
ing their location with a service or an application. ISACA
(2012) indicates, however, that a majority find that the risk
and benefits of location-based applications and services
are appropriately balanced, showing that although people
are apprehensive about privacy-breaches, they are likely to
share their location via sports tracking applications since
they deem the risk involved to be acceptable.
This study aimed to answer the following research
questions:
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Figure 1 Steps involved for home location. The flowchart illustrates the sequence of steps necessary to identify a runner’s home location.
1. What is the accuracy of an address identified on the
basis of routes available on social sports networks and
what is its implication in the Dutch urban context?
2. Are people more likely to disclose their address ‘indi-
rectly’ (i.e. via running routes published on sports
tracking networks) than ‘directly’ (i.e. by other sources
such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Yellow pages
and company websites)?
3. Is there a relation between the runners’ age and gen-
der and the disclosure of an address?
4. What is the window of opportunity for a burglary?
5. Is running temporally predictable?
Although studies exist about the relation between crime
and online leisure activities, most relate to dating sites,
chat rooms and Facebook. In addition, in many other
studies the concept of ‘leisure’ is operationalized as ‘going
out at night during weekends’ (e.g. Gottfredson 1984). The
present research is therefore concerned with a different
form of leisure activity (i.e. running). The contribution
of this study is the insight into the new phenomenon of
online social sports tracking networks and in particular,
its potential as a crime facilitator. The general approach of
the research is to look into the routine activities of the tar-
get rather than of the offender. In addition, this research
developed an algorithm to determine a home address




The aimwas to select a random sample of runners who use
an online sports social network to record their running
route. The runner characteristics measured were gender
and age. For the sample size selection, this study fol-
lowed Bartlett et al. (2001)’s suggestion to use Cochran’s
equationsa.
Estimating the population of runners using sports track-
ing applications is difficult because the number of users
per country is not listed in the websites. In addition, this
research focuses on RunKeeper, which is a very popu-
lar application in The Netherlands, but there are other
popular applications. According to Bottenburg (2006),
in The Netherlands one in ten inhabitants run (refer
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to the section ‘Measures’ for the definition of ‘runner’).
Given this figure and a combined population of Enschede,
Nijmegen and the nearby cities Hengelo and Arnhem of
approximately 550,000, the number of runners in this area
was estimated at 55,000. Given an assumption of 1,000
RunKeeper users in these cities (which one might con-
sider a conservative guess), the minimum sample size for
the study is 250 runners. An assumption of 5,000 users
would have yielded a sample size of 319 runners. Above
6,820 runners, the minimum sample size is 341 runners.
It is worth noting that the cities of Hengelo and Arnhem
fall within the search radius of Enschede and Nijmegen
and are therefore taken into account in this population
calculation.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence
that in The Netherlands running is geographically deter-
mined. Since running is easily accessible and location
independent, it was assumed that the chosen cities were
representative of The Netherlands as a whole.
The RunKeeper search engine was first queried to show
runners that had recorded at least one route. A random
sample was then drawn to select the runners for the study.
The sample consisted of 513 runners with a total of 15,471
routes (i.e. approximately 30 routes per runner). The unit
of analysis of the address disclosure evaluation is the indi-
vidual runner whilst the route constitutes the unit of
analysis of the temporal evaluation. For the temporal anal-
ysis, the sample size was 14,444 since some routes had no
timestamp.
Measures
A runner is a person above the age of 6 who runs at least
once a week (Bottenburg 2006). Indirect address disclo-
sure occurs when an address is inferred (i.e. predicted)
by means of exercise route data published in online social
sports networks. Direct address disclosure occurs when
an address is published in analogue or digital media such
as the phone book or other similar directories. Accuracy
defines how close a measurement is to the real value (i.e.
the true home location). Precision is defined as how close
together or how repeatable the results from a measure-
ment are (SABS Standards Division 2012). Figure 2 depicts
the possible combinations of accuracy and precision that
can be used in a cluster analysis:
1. points are both precise and accurate,
2. points are precise but inaccurate,
3. points are imprecise but accurate and,
4. points are neither precise nor accurate.
The variables ‘direct’ and ‘indirect disclosure of home
address’ are categorical variables (i.e. no-yes). Dichoto-
mous variables are used to describe personal characteris-
tics i.e. ‘gender’ (i.e. male vs. female) and ‘age’ (i.e. under
35 vs. 35 or older). The duration of the run is measured in
minutes. Regarding distance measurements for the algo-
rithm development, the (continuous) variables used were
a) distance in kilometres between the start and end point
of a route and b) number of GPS points per kilometre.
Procedure
The procedure to determine the direct and indirect disclo-
sure of home address and personal information consisted
of 3 basic steps.
1. Algorithm development, calibration and evaluation.
The algorithm was developed to determine the home
address of a runner based on his or her public run-
ning routes. The input for the algorithm is raw GPS
data, grouped by runner. The algorithm classifies
routes into suitable and unsuitable ones based on the
quality of the GPS recording. In addition, it classi-
fies the suitable routes into circular and non-circular.
Spatial analysis of the start-finish points of circular
routes was performed to identify the average point
(i.e. predicted home location). The minimum dis-
tance thresholds and minimum routes per cluster
were calibrated to yield the most reliable results (i.e.
precision). If there are insufficient routes per clus-
ter, non-circular routes having a starting point near
the average point are added to the analysis. 18 vol-
unteer runners participated in the evaluation of the
algorithm and their 2012 routes were used to generate
a map of their predicted home address. Subsequently,
the runners were asked if this predicted location was
accurate and to estimate the error. In other words,
the first part of the analysis (i.e. cluster analysis)
measures precision whilst the second part, involving
Figure 2 Accuracy and precision combinations. The diagrams depict four possible combinations of accuracy and precision for point data.
Stottelaar et al. Crime Science 2014, 3:8 Page 6 of 14
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/8
the volunteer runners, measures accuracy. Refer to
Appendix 1 for further details on the algorithm.
2. Selection of runners and routes. The search webpage
of RunKeeper was used to select runners from the
cities of Enschede and Nijmegen. Routes of 3, 4, 5, 7.5
and 10 kilometres were searched since these consti-
tute typical running distances. The search for routes
yielded 513 unique random usernames of runners (see
Figure 3 for an example of a map showing the result
of the search for routes of one runner, with individual
runs depicted with different colours).
All public workouts were requested for the period
between January 2011 and August 2013. This implies
that the search narrowed down by selecting only those
runners who had at least one recorded route in Run-
Keeper. The search engine did not search for specific
routes, but for routes within a certain distance. Con-
sequently, a search for a distance of 4 kilometres also
yields routes of 3 kilometres. It is possible that a user
may have added a route in Nijmegen while living in
Amsterdam.
3. Home address and personal information search. The
algorithm was applied to 513 runners to identify
whether it succeeded or not in estimating a home
address. To establish the age and gender of runners,
the Runkeeper profile photos were assessed and a
search was carried out by other means such as Face-
book, Twitter, LinkedIn, the Yellow Pages and also
company websites.
Statistical analysis
Three separate analyses were conducted for the address
disclosure evaluation. The first one involved testing
whether there were significant differences between direct
and indirect disclosure of addresses. The ratio of indi-
rect to direct disclosure was then calculated. The second
one tested the relation between one type of disclosure
(direct or indirect) and an independent variable (e.g.
direct disclosure and age). For both the first and second
analyses, cross tabulations and the Chi-square statistics
were obtained. To make a straight-forward comparison
between younger and older runners, the ratios of indirect
to direct disclosure were computed. Similarly, the ratio of
indirect to direct disclosure was calculated for females and
males. The third analysis consisted of a multinomial logis-
tic regression to model the disclosure of data based on
both age and gender. The dependent variable consisted of
4 categories: a) no disclosure (used as reference category),
b) indirect disclosure, c) direct disclosure and d) both indi-
rect and direct. The output of the regression is a relative
risk ratio (RRR) which is similar to the odds ratio used
in logistic regression. The standard interpretation of the
relative risk ratio is for a unit change in the independent
variable, the relative risk ratio of the dependent variable
m relative to the reference category is expected to change
by a factor of the respective parameter estimate given that
the variables in the model are held constant (Institute for
Digital Research and Education 2014).
The temporal evaluation involved three types of analy-
sis. The opportunity window of a burglary was obtained
by calculating the mean duration of runs. To test whether
individuals do runs of similar duration, a one-way analysis
of variance was performed and the intra-class correlation
(ICC) was computedb. Since the confidence intervals are
computed under the assumption that rho is normally dis-
tributed, it is appropriate to extend the assumption for
Figure 3 Example of route output. The map shows the result of the search for routes of one runner.
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providing a simple method to test the difference between
two ICCs. This method involves computing standardized
scores (i.e. z-scores) using the following formula (Newson
2002):
(c) z = (icc1−icc2)√
(se12+se22)
Runners that recorded only one route where not taken
into account for the calculation of the ICC.
Results
Disclosure of address
The validation work showed that the chosen algorithm
thresholds are sufficient to yield accurate results. The
average estimated error was 45 metres (SD = 74, 8).
It is worth mentioning that simple consumer type GPS
receivers, like the ones that are incorporated into smart-
phones, are only capable of measuring positional accuracy
to within a few tens of metres. For example, Garmin
(2013) claims that their receivers are accurate to within 15
metres.
Table 1 shows that 53 runners were located only directly,
162 only indirectly, 69 via both methods and 229 could
not be located. For 231 runners, the algorithm yielded 476
possible home addresses. This means that some runners
have more than one home address, such as students liv-
ing at the university and also with their parents. 66 out
of 69 indirect addresses were matched very closely to the
direct addresses. In three cases the direct home address
was more than 200 metres away from the indirect home
address. The results show a statistical significant differ-
ence between indirect and direct sharing of an address
(χ2 = 8.594, df = 1, p = 0.003). The ratio of indirect to
direct disclosure is 1.89.
The research tested the relation between the age of a
person and the disclosure (i.e. indirect or direct) of the
home location. Similarly, it tested the relation between the
gender of a person and the disclosure of the home loca-
tion. The results for age are presented in Table 2 and the
results for gender in Table 3. Of the 513 chosen runners,
age could not be determined for 130 of them. The results
show a statistically significant relationship between the
age of a runner and the direct disclosure of the address
(χ2 = 16.801, df = 4, p = 0.002). However, there was no
statistically significant relationship between the age and




Both Direct & Indirect 69 13.45
None (i.e. no disclosure) 229 44.64
Total 513 100.00
The table shows the number of RunKeeper runners for whom an address was
found directly and indirectly.
Table 2 Direct and indirect address search results based
on age characteristics
Age Direct Indirect Total
Freq. % Freq. % Freq.
Younger than 35 39 21.20 91 49.46 184
35 or older 80 40.20 107 53.77 199
Unknown 3 2.31 33 25.38 130
Total 122 23.78 231 45.03 513
The table shows the number of RunKeeper runners for whom an address was
found directly and indirectly, according to age group.
the indirect sharing of the address of a user. The ratio of
indirect to direct disclosure is higher for younger people
(i.e. 1.88) than for older people (i.e. 1.35). Gender could
not be determined for 93 out of the 513 runners. There is
strong evidence of a relationship between the gender and
the indirect sharing of the address (χ2 = 4.773, df = 1,
p = 0.03). There is no statistically significant relation-
ship between the gender and the direct sharing of a home
address. The ratio of indirect to direct disclosure of home
addresses is higher for males (i.e. 1.74) than for females
(i.e. 1.69).
Finally, the multinomial logistic regression model in
Table 4 provides further information since so far, only the
relation between one form of disclosure and one inde-
pendent variable has been tested at a time (e.g. indirect
disclosure with gender). The model shows that for females
(relative to males), the relative risk for a) indirect address
disclosure via Runkeeper (relative to no disclosure) would
be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.44 (p = 0.004),
b) direct disclosure (relative to no disclosure) would be
expected to decrease by a factor of 0.48 (p = 0.055) and
both direct and indirect disclosure (relative to no disclo-
sure) would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.49
(p = 0.047), given that the other variables in the model are
held constant. Similarly, the model shows that for older
runners (relative to younger ones), the relative risk for a)
indirect disclosure via Runkeeper (relative to no disclo-
sure) would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.02
(result not significant), b) direct disclosure (relative to no
disclosure) would be expected to increase by a factor of
Table 3 Direct and indirect address search results based
on gender
Gender Direct Indirect Total
Freq. % Freq. % Freq.
Male 96 30.67 167 53.35 313
Female 26 24.30 44 41.12 107
Unknown 0 0.00 20 21.51 93
Total 122 23.78 231 45.03 513
The table shows the number of RunKeeper runners for whom an address was
found directly and indirectly, according to gender.
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Table 4 Multinomial logistic regressionmodel
RRR SE Confidence interval
Lower 5% Upper 95%
RunKeeper
Older 1.02 0.26 0.63 1.67
Female 0.44 0.13 ** 0.25 0.77
Constant 1.23 0.23 0.86 1.77
Other online sources
Older 2.03 0.68 * 1.05 3.91
Female 0.48 0.18 a 0.22 1.07
Constant 0.34 0.09 *** 0.20 0.57
Both
Older 3.04 0.99 ** 1.61 5.76
Female 0.49 0.18 * 0.24 0.99
Constant 0.32 0.09 *** 0.19 0.54
The model predicts the disclosure of home address information for RunKeeper
runners.
‘None’ (i.e. no address disclosure) is the reference category.
*Significant: p < 0.05; **Significant: p < 0.01; ***Significant: p < 0.001.
N = 383 (χ2 = 27.69; p<0.001).
RRR: Relative risk ratio, SE: Standard error.
ap = 0.055.
2.03 (p = 0.035) and c) both direct and indirect dis-
closure (relative to no disclosure) would be expected to
increase by a factor of 3.04 (p = 0.001), given that the
other variables in the model are held constant.
Temporal characteristics
The window of opportunity for a burglary is on average
52.85 minutes (SD=57.58). The correlation of run dura-
tion within runners (i.e. ICC) is 0.13 (F = 11.11; df =
210/14, 213; p = 0.000). Regarding gender differences,
the correlation of run duration for female runners is 0.17
(F = 11.14; df = 159/11, 458; p = 0.000) whilst it is 0.13
for males (F = 2.39; df = 34/1, 989; p = 0.000). With
regards to age differences, the correlation of run duration
for younger runners is 0.15 (F = 9.58; df = 130/6, 768;
p = 0.000) whilst it is 0.11 for older ones (F = 12.89;
df = 55/5, 365; p = 0.000).
The correlation of hour of run start within runners is
0.20 (F = 18.27; df = 210/14, 213; p = 0.000). Regard-
ing gender differences, the correlation of hour of run start
within female runners is 0.16 (F = 11.35; df = 34/1, 989;
p = 0.000) whilst it is 0.20 for males (F = 19.31; df =
159/11, 458; p = 0.000). With regards to age differences,
the correlation of the hour of run start for younger run-
ners is 0.19 (F = 12.31; df = 139/6, 768; p = 0.000)
whilst it is 0.18 for older ones (F = 21.75; df = 55/5, 365;
p = 0.000).
The correlation of day of week within runners is 0.02
(F = 2.16; df = 210/14, 213; p = 0.000). Regarding gen-
der differences, the correlation of day of week for female
runners is 0.01 (F = 1.85; df = 34/1, 989; p = 0.002)
whilst it is 0.02 for males (F = 2.29; df = 159/11, 458;
p = 0.000). With regards to age differences, the correla-
tion of day of week for young runners is 0.02 (F = 2.10;
df = 139/6, 768; p = 0.000) whilst it is 0.01 for older ones
(F = 2.08; df = 55/5, 365; p = 0.000). Refer to Tables 5
and 6 for an overview of the ICC analysis.
Discussion
This research has shown that a runner’s home location can
be predicted via sports tracking application data. A home
address, together with other information, can increase
crime opportunity for burglars or identity fraudsters. An
algorithm was described to determine a home address
based on public workouts. For 36 out of 69 runners both
directly and indirectly located, the home addressmatched.
The first research question related to the accuracy of
an address identified on the basis of online social sports
networks and its implication in the Dutch context. The
estimated average error of the algorithm is 45 metres.
Assuming a typical Dutch urban neighbourhood consist-
ing of single family houses (i.e. parcel widths of 10 metres,
houses on both sides of the road with back entrances), the
algorithm narrows the estimated position down to within
8 possible houses. A quick field expedition to check family
name signs on the front door of houses would enable the
correct house to be identified. In addition, although evi-
dence shows that burglars do not necessarily target more
affluent areas (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005) (since
these have often higher security), it is possible that those
who go to the trouble of preparing a burglary using online
sources might consider the trade-offs of targeting more
affluent areas over less affluent ones. Since the parcel sizes
in more affluent areas are generally larger, this algorithm
would most likely yield the exact house or the one next
door. The same would apply in other countries where the
Table 5 Intraclass correlations for gender
Variable and categories ICC SE Confidence interval Z
Lower 5% Upper 95%
Run duration
Male (ref. cat.) 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.17
Female 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.74
Hour of run start
Male (ref. cat.) 0.20 0.03 0.14 0.27
Female 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.25 -0.80
Day of week
Male (ref. cat.) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Female 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00
The table shows the correlations within runners, standard errors, confidence
intervals of the ICC and z-score.
‘Between subject’ N = 134; ‘within subject’ N = 1,989; Z: z-score.
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Table 6 Intraclass correlations for age
Variable and categories ICC SE Confidence interval Z
Lower 5% Upper 95%
Run duration
Younger than 35 (ref. cat) 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.21
35 or older 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.71
Hour of run start
Younger than 35 (ref. cat) 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.26
35 or older 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.17
Day of week
Younger than 35 (ref. cat) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
35 or older 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.02
The table shows the correlations within runners, standard errors, confidence
intervals of the ICC and z-score.
‘Between subject’ N = 139; ‘within subject’ N = 6,768; Z: z-score.
parcel sizes are in general larger (e.g. USA). Although the
runners that took part in the algorithm validation had ‘pri-
vate’ workouts, most were surprised about the accuracy of
the algorithm.
The second question aimed to identify whether a statis-
tically significant difference existed between the indirect
disclosure and the direct disclosure of a home addresses.
Table 1 shows that runners tend to disclose their address
indirectly more often than directly. The ratio of indirect
to direct disclosure is 1.89. 23% of the participants of the
research conducted by Madden and Smith (2010) did not
know if their home address (direct address in this case)
was available online. We suspect that a higher percent-
age might be unaware that it is possible to determine an
address based on sports data.
The third research question regarded the relation
between the age and gender of a runner and the disclosure
of the home address (either directly or indirectly). The
ratio of indirect to direct disclosure of home addresses is
higher for younger people than for older people. A pos-
sible explanation is that older people are more likely to
be found in the phone book, since younger people have
not settled down yet and/or prefer a mobile telephone line
instead of a fixed line. Disclosure of home address via both
methods increases with age. The findings support the
view of Madden and Smith (2010) who found that the dis-
closure of home address increases with age. Older people
possibly have less understanding of Internet-based risks.
Regarding gender, the ratio of indirect to direct disclosure
of home addresses is higher for males than for females. No
literature was found to explain this difference but we sus-
pect that females might bemore cautious, possibly for fear
of assault. Women are less likely to disclose their home
address via both methods than males (result is marginally
significant). This finding is in line with Stutzman and
Kramer-Duffield (2010), who found that women are more
cautious than males with regards to online privacy.
The fourth research question aimed to identify the win-
dow of opportunity for a residential burglary based on the
running activity. It was found that there is a window of
approximately one-hour. Since many sources (e.g. Cusson
1993; Safewise 2013) indicate that most burglars spend
less than 10 minutes at the crime scene, such a window
provides sufficient time to carry out the crime.
The fifth research question related to whether previous
temporal characteristics predict future temporal charac-
teristics for the same runner. The general finding is that
the hour of start of a run is the most predictable tempo-
ral variable, followed by its duration and day of week. The
temporal predictability always decreases with age but the
results are mixed for gender. Males have more predictable
patterns with respect to the run’s starting hour and the day
of week whilst females are more predictable with respect
to the duration. Knowledge of this temporal predictability
would probably increase the confidence of the motivated
criminal.
RunKeeper offers three types of privacy settings: pub-
lic, friends only and private. This research used public
workouts which can be viewed by anyone, not requiring
a RunKeeper user account. On average, the 18 runners
who participated in the algorithm validation provided
24 routes per user whereas the 513 runners provided
30 routes per user. For 66 runners the address matched
both directly and indirectly despite the 45 metre error of
the algorithm. However, the accuracy of home addresses
and the number of located runners could be increased if
friends-only workouts were to be used.
This research identifies previously undetected crime
risks that could be easily reduced. Regarding recommen-
dations to reduce risk, an awareness campaign about the
risks involved would probably have an impact since the
participants in the algorithm validation were surprised
about its accuracy and hence unaware of what can be
achieved by analysing running data. In particular, users
of these types of networks should be made aware of
their potential for data mining which refers to the auto-
matic or semi-automatic data analysis to extract previ-
ously unknown patterns. In addition, since some runners
sometimes share their ‘favourite’ routes with strangers
because they wish to suggest interesting, demanding or
simply ‘nice’ runs, it would be advisable to remove the
starting and ending portions of the route. The software
developer should highlight the risks of runners sharing
their routes, particularly when they start and end at home.
In addition, an automatic removal of the starting and end-
ing portions of all routes could be performed directly by
the software developer. Such an action would constitute
a known standard setting that would credit the developer
with having a security policy to protect users.
By preventing a potential burglar or robber from find-
ing a temporal pattern in the running activity (i.e. routine
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activity), his/her perception of risk would be increased,
hence reducing the runner’s likelihood of becoming the
victim of a burglar, robber or of a predatory offender.
This last measure constitutes situational crime preven-
tion because it involves the modification of the (potential)
crime settings, making criminal action less attractive to
offenders.
Conclusions
The present research focused on runners but further
research could be carried out to estimate the spatio-
temporal pattern of cyclists, since bicycle theft and/or
robbery while out cycling is a problem in some countries.
This research suggests that people might neglect the
risks of inadvertently disclosing personal information that
could increase their susceptibility to victimization possi-
bly as the wish to socialize and to highlight their sporting
achievements overrides their natural caution. Rather than
looking into the routine activities of the criminal, this
research has looked into the routine activities of the tar-
get. It shows how the unique combination of spatial and
temporal information available in online sports tracking
networks can enable criminals to predict with high like-
lihood where a potential target lives and when he or she
will be out running. On the basis of these findings one can
conclude that online sports tracking networks have poten-
tial to be part of the modus operandi of several types of
crime, both at home and en-route. This research therefore
shows that there is scope for traditional crime to become
increasingly ‘digitalized’.
Endnotes
a(a) n0 = t2∗(p)(1−p)d2 (b) n1 = n01+n0/N where t is the
value for the selected alpha level of 0.25 in each tail (i.e.
1.96), (p)(1 − p) is the estimate of variance (by manual
inspection of workouts, we estimated p =1 /3), d is the
acceptable margin of error for the proportion being
estimated (i.e. 5% or 0.05) and N is the population size.
Formula (b) should be applied when n0 exceeds 5% of the
population.
bThe ICC is a measure of agreement unlike the
commonly used Pearson correlation which is a measure
of association. Therefore, the standards that apply to a
Pearson correlation do not apply to an ICC. For example,
while a Pearson correlation of 0.3 may be considered
small, an ICC of 0.3 is quite large.
Appendix 1: Algorithm
The first phase is pre-processing and is based on sev-
eral properties that are calculated for each route. The
following are the steps in the pre-processing phase:
1. For each route, the distance between the start point
and end point is calculated.
2. For each route, the number of GPS points per distance
unit is calculated.
The first metric allows non-circular routes to be filtered.
The logic behind this is the following: running is an exer-
cise that can be done everywhere but it tends to start and
end at home; however, some people stop recording their
workout just before they arrive home since they want to
‘cool down’. Since this interferes with the statistics of the
run, it is common that runners do not record the last part
(i.e. the ‘cool down’ phase) of their run. Therefore, the
algorithm takes a distanceD between the start and the end
into account.
Figure 4 Basic examples demonstrating the algorithm. a) Start-stop of all routes close to each other b) Start-stop of one route exceeds a certain
threshold and c) Invalid route supports the cluster of two valid ones due to its start position.
Stottelaar et al. Crime Science 2014, 3:8 Page 11 of 14
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/8
Figure 5Weighted average point. Arrow 1 denotes the weighted
average point forW = 0.75 and arrow 2 forW = 0.5 (normal).
The second metric allows the algorithm to distinguish
between good and bad recordings. It is common that a
runner sets a GPS to record at once a second (i.e. 1 Hz).
Under optimal circumstances and a running speed of 12
kilometres per hour, a location is recorded every 3.33
metres. However, poor reception perhaps due to atmo-
spheric factors, terrain, tree canopy or tall buildings can
produce unsuitable recordings. A limit P was chosen as a
lower bound on the number of GPS recordings per dis-
tance of 1 kilometre (PPD). This classifies recorded work-
outs (including manually entered ones) into suitable and
unsuitable ones. All routes that comply with the chosen
thresholds are referred to as ‘valid routes’ (i.e. candidate
routes).
The third step involves the spatial analysis of clusters.
Since the location of the houses is unknown, the met-
ric used was precision. This step involves first iterating
each valid route for each runner to determine the average
start-stop point. Each average point was then compared
to other average points and was allocated to a cluster if
the distance between these two points was within range R
(i.e. the average point delta distance). This implies that the
points are precise. If a cluster of average points is above
the threshold S, it is assumed to be a home address. If the
cluster of average points is too small (i.e. it contains very
few points), but is near the threshold S, all other routes
(including invalid ones) outside the cluster are inspected
for a starting point near the average point of the cluster
which minimizes the distance. In this way, workouts that
finished further away can still support the cluster if the
starting point is close to the average start-stop. Figure 4
describes this reasoning.
1. Start-stop of all routes close to each other.
2. Start-stop of one route that exceeds a certain thresh-
old.
3. Invalid route supports the cluster of two valid ones
due to its start position.
The average point requires further refinement for two
reasons. As already mentioned, often people finish their
workout recording earlier to ‘cool down’ and walk home
which means that the end point is not near the start
point. Second, sometimes there is a delay in obtaining a
GPS position and the initial readings may be inaccurate
as the GPS acquires the satellite constellation. Less accu-
rate home addresses are obtained by taking the average
point as Paverage = (Pstart + Pstop)/2. To tackle this prob-
lem, a weighted average is used and the average is defined
as Paverage = X ∗Pstart + (1−X)∗Pstop. Figure 5 illustrates
this issue.
Two additional figures were generated to verify the algo-
rithm’s thresholds. Figure 6 shows the number of routes
per runner for all runners and for selected runners. An
almost identical distribution of routes was selected com-
pared to all processed routes. Since most runners have
only a few routes available, a threshold of minimum clus-
ter size S = 3 was considered reasonable. Figure 7 shows
the frequency distributions of the route lengths, the delta
distance and the points per distance for all the routes and
for the selected routes. The first column shows that most
routes are shorter than 20 km. The delta distance shows
Figure 6 Number of routes per person. Distributions of the number of routes per person for all routes and for selected routes.
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Figure 7 Route characteristics. Distributions of length, delta distance and points per distance for valid and for selected routes (in kilometres).
that in the context of running, the distance between start
and end is usually below 500 metres. A delta distance of
D = 500 metres was therefore chosen. A lower bound of
P = 20 was chosen for theminimumnumber of points per
distance (PPD). This implies a GPS recording is needed on
average every 50 metres, which seems an adequate num-
ber to account for poor GPS signal reception, for up to
80 points per distance (PPD) of one kilometre. Figure 7
also shows that lowering the thresholds does not consid-
erably affect the number of located runners, except for the
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cluster size S. In this experiment, lowering the cluster size
to S = 2 resulted in 287 located runners instead of 231,
thus lowering its rigorousness.
An initial estimation and some experimenting with the
thresholds therefore resulted in the following values:
• Delta distance D = 500metres.
• Lower bound of P = 20 points per distance.
• Average point weightW = 0.90%.
• Average point delta distance R = 150metres.
• Cluster size S = 3.
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